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Available online 13 December 2014Primate studies show slow ramping activity in posterior parietal cortex (PPC) neurons during perceptual
decision-making. These ﬁndings have inspired a rich theoretical literature to account for this activity. These ac-
counts are largely unrelated to Bayesian theories of perception and predictive coding, a related formulation of
perceptual inference in the cortical hierarchy. Here, we tested a key prediction of such hierarchical inference,
namely that the estimated precision (reliability) of information ascending the cortical hierarchy plays a key
role in determining both the speed of decision-making and the rate of increase of PPC activity. Using dynamic
causal modelling of magnetoencephalographic (MEG) evoked responses, recorded during a simple perceptual
decision-making task, we recover ramping-activity from an anatomically and functionally plausible network of
regions, including early visual cortex, the middle temporal area (MT) and PPC. Precision, as reﬂected by the
gain on pyramidal cell activity, was strongly correlated with both the speed of decision making and the slope
of PPC ramping activity. Our ﬁndings indicate that the dynamics of neuronal activity in the human PPC during
perceptual decision-making recapitulate those observed in the macaque, and in so doing we link observations
from primate electrophysiology and human choice behaviour. Moreover, the synaptic gain control modulating
these dynamics is consistent with predictive coding formulations of evidence accumulation.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
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Although perceptual judgements can bemade rapidly, many involve
integrating information over an extended period of time. Slow ramping
activity within neurons in posterior parietal cortex is critical for such
decisions, often interpreted as representing a gradual accumulation of
evidence for one option or other (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Huk
and Shadlen, 2005;Hanks et al., 2006; Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Howev-
er, the relationship between hypothesised evidence accumulation pro-
cesses and more general theories of perception has not been widely
explored, it is now increasingly accepted that classical evidence accu-
mulation schemes are a special case of generic Bayesian inference
about the causes of sensory input (Bitzer et al., 2014). In this paper,
we consider evidence accumulation as perceptual inference in the con-
text of predictive coding and ask whether we can understand the neu-
ronal correlates in this light.
Predictive coding is an inﬂuential theory of perception (Rao and
Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2008; Summerﬁeld and Egner, 2009) and brain
function (Friston, 2010) in which inference is realised in messageeuroimaging, 12 Queen Square,
zGerald).
. This is an open access article underpassing between hierarchically organised brain regions (Felleman and
Van Essen, 1991; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2008), with top-
down signals encoding predictions and bottom-up signals encoding
prediction errors. In brief, ascending prediction errors are accumulated
by high-level units encoding posterior expectations. In order to approx-
imate Bayes-optimal inference, the brain needs to represent the
estimated precision (inverse variance) of ascending sensory signals
(prediction errors) (Feldman and Friston, 2010). The expected precision
is proposed to play a key role in weighting sensory evidence against
prior beliefs and optimises the rate of evidence (prediction error)
accumulation.
In the context of evidence accumulation, a natural hypothesis is that
precise sensory information should produce faster responding, via an
increased ramping of neuronal activity in PPC. It has been proposed
that precision is encoded by a gain of (prediction-error signalling) su-
perﬁcial pyramidal cells (Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Bastos et al., 2012;
Brown and Friston, 2012), a hypothesis supported by biophysically
plausible modelling of electrophysiological data recorded during per-
ceptual tasks under conditions of varying sensory precision (Garrido
et al., 2009; Brown and Friston, 2012;Moran et al., 2013). Here, wemea-
sured in vivo activity using source localised MEG and tested an hypoth-
esis that the speed of subject's responses on a simple perceptual
decision-making task would vary with the gain on pyramidal cells inthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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namic causal modelling (DCM), using validated and biophysically plau-
sible models (Jansen and Rit, 1995; Daunizeau et al., 2011). In the
context of the model, pyramidal cell gain is captured by modulating
the strength of connections between spiny stellate and pyramidal
cells, as this directly alters the sensitivity of pyramidal cell responses
to extrinsic inputs (see Fig. 1). We compared this against a hypothesis
that response speed would vary with the strength of extrinsic forward
connections, which only indirectly alters pyramidal cell activity, and
does not change the responsiveness of pyramidal cells to a given input
from stellate cells. Note that there is an intimate relationship between
the gain or sensitivity of pyramidal cells and the speed of their re-
sponses to (or accumulation of) presynaptic input. This is because the
(intrinsic) connectivity modelling gain plays the role of a synaptic rate
constant.
Depending upon both the nature of the perceptual task and theway
in which sensory precision is manipulated, one might expect to ﬁnd
changes in pyramidal cell gain at different levels of the cortical hierar-
chy. Here, given that sensory precision is modulated by varying themo-
tion coherence (rather than the properties of individual dots or their
motion), gainmodulation in regions encoding hypotheses aboutmotion
direction (putatively the PPC) is likely to be key. Nonetheless, it is con-
ceivable that this might also be accompanied by precision changes in
other areas. Formally speaking, the key determinant of accumulation
dynamics rests upon the precision of ascending prediction errors, rela-
tive to the precision of prediction errors at the hierarchical level in ques-
tion. This means that there is likely to be a delicate and balanced gain
control at all levels of the cortical hierarchy. This notion is consistent
with (the multilevel) projections that might mediate precision or gain
control (e.g., thalamocortical projections from the pulvinar).
Using DCM, a biologically grounded form of spatiotemporal source
reconstruction, we were able to ask whether activity in human PPC re-
sembles that recorded in monkeys. Because MEG sums activity across
millions of neurons, we cannot test for slow ramping activity in
decision-selective cells, as typically reported in primate single-unit
studies (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Insteadwe need to derive predictions
about population-level activity. Previous work considering population
level activity in mutual and pooled inhibition models of decision-
making suggests that over the course of a trial activity in the PPC shouldFig. 1. Illustration of candidate neuronalmechanisms underlying behavioural andneuronal resp
stellate cells, pyramidal cells that send extrinsic forward connections to other cortical regions,
(gain) of connections between these populations is parameterised by γ1− 4. Based on predictive
precision of ascending sensory information, which is operationalised in our model as the gain (
lation (left).We comparedmodels inwhich the strength of intrinsic gain changedwith respons
a null model in which response time had no effect (not shown).gradually increase, and that the rate of increase will correlate with re-
sponse speed (Wang, 2002; Bogacz et al., 2006; Wong and Wang,
2006; Hunt et al., 2012). Our hypothesis was that precision encoding
(the gain of superﬁcial pyramidal cells) is the mechanism underlying
these responses.
Methods
Subjects
Twenty one (13 female) right handed subjects, age range 19–29,
participated in the study. All subjects were free of neurological or psy-
chiatric disease and provided informed consent. The study was ap-
proved by the Joint National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery
(University College London Hospitals NHS trust) and Institute of
Neurology (University College London) Ethics Committee.
Stimuli & task
Subjects performed a simple direction-discrimination task on a ﬁeld
of moving dots (Fig. 2). Uncertainty (or precision) was varied by chang-
ing the proportion of dots that weremoving coherently in the target di-
rection (either right or left), versus those moving randomly. 185 dots,
moving at approximately 10.7 degrees per second, were presented in
a circular ﬁeld subtending a radius of approximately 10°. Subjects
responded using two keypads, one held in either hand, and were free
to respond as soon as they wished.
In each trial, a red cross (which subjectswere instructed to ﬁxate on)
appeared in themiddle of the screen, surrounded by a ﬁeld of stationary
dots. After a delay jittered between 1000 and 1500 ms, the dots started
moving.Motion continued for 3000ms, or until the subject pressed a re-
sponse key. Once the dots had disappeared, a blank screen appeared for
3000 msminus the time subjects had taken to respond (to ensure trials
were evenly spaced), followed by an inter-trial interval of 1500 ms.
Subjects ﬁrst performed a 112 trial practise session to calibrate task
performance. Responses were then ﬁt with a logistic function to derive
individually tailored coherence levels that provided four coherence
levels, corresponding to performance levels of approximately 55, 70,
85 and 95% correct. These coherence levels were held constantonse time variability. Ourmodel contains three neuronal populations, input receiving spiny
and inhibitory interneurons (Jansen and Rit, 1995; David and Friston, 2003). The strength
coding, we hypothesised that response time variability would be driven by changes in the
γ2) on the connection between input receiving stellate cells and the pyramidal cell popu-
e time, compared to changes in extrinsic forward connections between regions (right), and
Fig. 2. A. Top left panel: Illustration of a single trial of the direction discrimination task. A red ﬁxation cross appeared, surrounded by a ﬁeld of stationary dots. After an interval, jittered
between 1000 and1500ms, the dots began tomove. A subset of the dotsmoved coherently, and the restmoved randomly. Subjects had 3000ms tomake their decision; indicatingwheth-
er they thought the direction of coherent motion was to the left or to the right. Dots disappeared from the screen once the decision was made, and a blank screen was shown for the re-
mainder of 3000ms, plus a further 1000ms. B. Top right panel: Bar plot showing themean coherence level of trials in each of the three reaction time bins used to analyse the behavioural
data. Reaction time andmotion coherence level showed a strongnegative correlation. (Red: RT bin 1 (fastest). Green: RT bin 2 (intermediate). Blue: RT bin 3 (slowest)) (error bars indicate
bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals). C. Bottom left panel: Average reaction time for each coherence level averaged across subjects. Reaction times showed a strong negative relation-
ship with coherence level. (Error bars indicate bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals). D. Bottom right panel: Choice behaviour averaged across subjects. Both direction of motion and
coherence level strongly affected choice behaviour, which was well ﬁt with a sigmoid function. (Error bars indicate bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals).
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formed three sessions of the task, each comprised of 112 trials. Four co-
herence levels were used for each direction of motion, giving eight trial
types in all, presented randomly within each session.
Behavioural analysis
To test an effect of coherence level on response accuracy we re-
moved trials on which subjects failed to respond, and then performed
a logistic regression on response data fromeach subject. Group level sta-
tistics were performed on the regression coefﬁcients using a nonpara-
metric Wilcoxon signed rank test.
To examine the predicted relationship between RT and coherence
level, for each subject we categorised trials into three reaction time
bins (slow, middle and fast) and analysed the mean coherence levelsin each bin across subjects. Three pair wise comparisons between bins
were performed using a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test.
MEG data acquisition and preprocessing
MEG data were acquired using a CTF 275-channel whole-head MEG
system at a sampling rate of 600 Hz. To allow continuous monitoring of
subjects' head positions, three energised electrical coils were attached
to the ﬁducials (left and right pre-auricular, nasion). Data were
downsampled to 200 Hz, bandpass ﬁltered between 0.1 and 40 Hz and
epoched between 1000ms before movement onset to 3000ms after. In-
dependent component analysis was applied and components corre-
sponding to eye movements and physiological noise were discarded.
We then performed a further visual inspection on the data, and excluded
any trials that still contained artefacts. Finally, we baseline corrected to
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performed in SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London,
UK, www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm), except for independent component
analysis, which was performed using Fieldtrip (Oostenveld et al., 2011).
For each subject, trials on which they either made errors or failed to
respondwere excluded, and the remainder divided up into three equal-
sized bins according to reaction time. These were then averaged, giving
three evoked responses per subject. We adopted this binning strategy,
rather than treating reaction times as a parametric regressor across tri-
als, for computational expediency and statistical efﬁciency. Although a
ﬁne-grained binning can reproduce parametric analyses, it entails
inverting many more (potentially noisier) event related ﬁelds.
MEG source reconstruction
To identify areas generating these ERFs,we performed source recon-
struction using Multiple Sparse Priors (MSP) (Friston et al., 2008) on
the grand average evoked responses across all subjects, over the interval
0–500 ms post motion onset. We selected this interval as it enables an
efﬁcient estimation of ramping that is not confounded by activity relat-
ed directly tomotor responding, since for all RT bins subjects responded
more than 500 ms after the end of the time window of interest (Fig. 1).
That this strategy was successful is indicated in our source localisation
analysis, which suggests that the main contributors to activity between
0 and 500ms after stimulus onset were occipital and parietal responses,
rather than frontal (we do not wish to make any strong claim about
whether ramping activity in the posterior parietal cortex itself reﬂects
‘pure’ perceptual decision-making, or rather an unfolding of decisions
in action space (Cisek, 2007), which falls beyond the scope of this
study). Source reconstruction and dynamic causal modelling (DCM)
were performed using SPM12 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimag-
ing, London, UK, www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
The MSP source reconstruction highlighted three bilaterally sym-
metrical regions contributing most to the evoked response between 0
and 500 ms: namely, early visual cortex (VC), a middle temporal area
(MT), and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) (Fig. 2). This corresponded
closely to our predictions, since these are all regions known to be in-
volved in processing of motion (Britten et al., 1993; Cook and
Maunsell, 2002) and are also implicated in perceptual decision-
making (Ditterich et al., 2003; Hanks et al., 2006; Gold and Shadlen,
2007).
Dynamic causal modelling
Dynamic causal modelling uses a biophysically plausible neuronal
mass model (of hidden neuronal dynamics), an electromagnetic for-
ward model (which maps hidden neuronal states to observed data),
and a variational Bayesian inversion scheme to make inferences about
neuronal connectivity and synaptic efﬁcacy (Kiebel et al., 2009). In the
neuronalmodel, each cortical source comprises three neural subpopula-
tions (Jansen and Rit, 1995; David and Friston, 2003): inhibitory cells,
spiny cells, and pyramidal cells, that are coupled by differential equa-
tions based on known (intrinsic) connectivity between cortical layers
(Jansen and Rit, 1995). Sources are linked by extrinsic connections,
based on known connectivity rules (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991),
where extrinsic forward connections are excitatory, and extrinsic
backward connections are inhibitory and excitatory. In such models,
the effect of precision, as posited by generalised predictive coding
(Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Bastos et al., 2012) is modelled as the gain
of superﬁcial pyramidal cells. In this model, we operationalise this
gain as an intrinsic connectivity parameter that ampliﬁes bottom-up
signals — from the forward input-receiving spiny stellate cells in the
granular layers to the pyramidal cell population (Fig. 1). We tested
this hypothesis against the alternative that changes in response time
were determined by modulations in the strength of extrinsic forward
connections between cortical regions.Based on the MSP source reconstruction, which was highly consis-
tent with our a priori predictions based on the existing literature
(Gold and Shadlen, 2007), we modelled evoked responses between 0
and 500 ms post-motion onset with six sources, left and right VC
([−19/19−86−14], MNI coordinates), left and right MT ([−46/46
−70 −6], MNI coordinates), left and right PPC ([−33/33 −48 40],
MNI coordinates) using 8 spatial modes.
Inputs were modelled as a sustained (cumulative Gaussian) input
with a priormean at 200ms post-motion onset and a prior standard de-
viation of 16ms. This input was based on single unit studies, which sug-
gest that decision-related activity is only seen in the lateral intraparietal
area after 220ms (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Huk and Shadlen, 2005;
Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Note that in the dynamic causal models that
we use the mean and standard deviation of the input are free parame-
ters that are optimised to ﬁt the data. This provides a considerable de-
gree of robustness against misspeciﬁcation, and allows for inter-
individual variability in the shape and timing of inputs. Additionally
however, we checked the appropriateness of this prior by varying its
mean between 100, 150, 200 and 250 ms (using the winning model of
the grand average evoked response from the network structure selec-
tion step described below). An input with a mean at 200 ms had the
highest evidence, with a log Bayes factor of 73.50 and a posterior prob-
ability of N0.999, compared with the next best model, and a prior mean
of 200 ms was thus used for all subsequent analyses.
To establish the connectivity structure between sources, we speci-
ﬁed 10 plausiblemodels (Fig. 3) representing both serial and parallel hi-
erarchies, with and without inter-hemispheric connections. These
models were ﬁtted separately to the grand average evoked response
for each of the three response speeds, and ﬁxed effects Bayesian
model selection (BMS) was used to identify the best model by pooling
over the three conditions.
Having established the network architecture that best modelled the
data as a whole, we then characterised how network activity varied be-
tween the three reaction time conditions. Here, we use reaction time
(RT) as a proxy for the underlying conﬁdence or precision employed
by the subjects.Weﬁtted three families ofmodels (ten in total), that dif-
fered only in howRTmodulated synaptic gain, to single subject data and
performed family level random effects inference (Penny et al., 2010).
The ﬁrst (‘gain’) family consisted of six models where RT modulated
the intrinsic forward (amplifying) connection from spiny stellate to
the pyramidal cells, within VC, MT, PPC or any combination of the
three. The second (‘connection’) family consisted of three models in
which RT modulated forward connections from VC to MT, from MT to
PPC, or both (models 8–10). The third (‘null’) family comprised a single
model in which RT had no effect.
To test for regionally speciﬁc effects of the RTmodulation on connec-
tivity, we performed Bayesian model averaging over the winning
(‘gain’) family of models for each subject, applying Occam's window
with a minimal posterior odds ratio of 0.05 (Penny et al., 2010).
Group-level statistical analysis was performed on parameter estimates
for the RT modulation from the winning family separately for each
region averaged across hemispheres. We tested whether the RT modu-
lation was signiﬁcantly greater than zero, using a one-tailed non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test Bonferroni corrected for three
comparisons. Interactions between the strength of effect between re-
gions were tested using a two-tailed signed rank test Bonferroni
corrected for three comparisons.
Intrinsic variability
Our primary hypothesis concerns the neurobiological mechanisms
underlying response-time variability, irrespective of whether this de-
pends on ‘external’ (here the motion coherence level), or ‘internal’ fac-
tors. We thus varied coherence levels to induce variability between
trials, and exploited this source of experimental variancewhen estimat-
ing model parameters. However, it is also interesting to ask whether
Fig. 3. A. Top row: Topoplots illustrating grandmean evoked ﬁelds, averaged across all time bins, at 50, 250 and 450ms. B. Bottom row: Topoplots illustrating the effect of response speed
(faster responses minus slower) on grand mean evoked ﬁelds at 50, 250 and 450 ms. Response speed shows a similar topography to evoked ﬁelds averaged across conditions, consistent
with its correlations with stronger (and faster rising) activity in the same cortical areas.
Fig. 4.A. Left panel: Active sources fromMSP reconstruction of evoked responses from0 to
500 ms (the image shows the 200 most activated voxels). Three bilateral sources were
found, in the early visual cortex (VC), themiddle temporal area (MT) and the posterior pa-
rietal cortex (PPC). B. Right panel: Winning network structure from our dynamic causal
modelling analysis. This reveals a plausible hierarchy in which PPC sits at the top, VC at
the bottom, and MT in between.
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changes in gain on pyramidal cells. To this end, we performed an addi-
tional analysis, where we separated trials within each coherence level
into three equal sized bins, and then averaged across coherence levels
for each bin. Thus any differences between bins cannot be explained
by coherence levels, but instead reﬂects intrinsic variability. We then
ﬁtted the same three families ofmodels described above and performed
random effects inference to compare the ensuing families.
Population activity
To test our predictions about neuronal dynamics in PPC, and how it
might vary at different RT levels, we reconstructed predicted pyramidal
cell activity from thewinning family separately for each region and each
subject. We normalised activity levels for each region by the maximum
estimated level, averaged across hemispheres and plotted the average
responses. For each subject, predicted activity was estimated by taking
an average of the responses predicted by each model in the winning
family, weighted by the (normalised) posterior probability for that
model and subject from the random effects analysis. This procedure is
analogous to Bayesian parameter averaging (Penny et al., 2007), but ap-
plied to the responses predicted on the basis of the parameters.
Sensitivity analysis
To provide a qualitative illustration of the effects of varying the in-
trinsic gain and forward connection parameters, we performed a contri-
bution or sensitivity analysis (the change in response with respect to
the change in a parameter). Here, we simulated data using the winning
network structure (Fig. 4), with all the parameters set to their Bayesian
model average across subjects.We then increased the strength of the in-
trinsic connection within the parietal cortex by a small amount, and
used the difference between the ensuing responses to assess the effects
of intrinsic gain on PPC activity. To compare these effects to those gen-
erated by altering forward connections strengths, we repeated this
analysis for the forward connection fromMT to PPC. For graphical illus-
tration, the sensitivity to changes in parameters was normalised to the
maximum response.Results
Behaviour
Within the entire data set, coherence level strongly affected both the
proportion of correct trials and reaction times (Fig. 2). Coherence level
and response accuracy were positively related (mean response accura-
cies going from high to low coherence: 91.2%, 87.3%, 74.1%, 62.0%),
whilst coherence level and RTs were negatively related (mean RTs:
1880 ms, 1792 ms, 1617 ms, 1374 ms). Group level analysis of regres-
sion coefﬁcients showed that both relationships were highly signiﬁcant
at the group level (median regression coefﬁcient for coherence: 18.4, for
RT:−4580, both p20 b 0.001, Wilcoxon signed rank test). On average,
subjects failed to respond on 2.5% of trials.
Dividing the data by response time (as used in the DCM analysis)
showed a similar pattern; with mean reaction times for each of the
three bins being 1068 ms, 1563 ms and 2186 ms respectively. As
Fig. 5. Models used for initial network selection. We tested 10 anatomically plausible
models, in linear and parallel hierarchies, with and without lateral connections. Regions
at the same level in the ﬁgure are connected by lateral connections; regions at different
levels are connected by both forward connections (running from lower to higher levels)
and backward connections (running from higher to lower).
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(Fig. 1). Mean coherence levels for each bin were 14.1% (bin 1), 10.4%
(bin 2), 7.9% (bin 3) (all differences signiﬁcant at p20 b 0.001, Wilcoxon
signed rank test). This establishes a behavioural validation of the exper-
imental stimulus manipulations and associates faster reaction times
with more coherent (precise) sensory information.
Source reconstruction & network selection
Source reconstruction showed three bilateral sources with the larg-
est posterior estimates of evoked power (the sum of squared source ac-
tivity during the time window of interest) (Litvak and Friston, 2008).
These located to early visual cortex (VC), a mid-temporal cortical area
(MT) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) (Fig. 2). These locations repre-
sent a plausible functional architecture, given the well-established role
of MT in processing motion (Britten et al., 1993; Treue and Maunsell,
1996; Chawla et al., 1998), and the critical importance of posterior pari-
etal cortex for this type of perceptual decision-making task (Gold and
Shadlen, 2007).
Bayesian model selection suggested that the network structure that
best described the datawas a linear hierarchy,with PPC at the top,MT in
the middle and VC at the bottom (Figs. 4,5). The winning model had a
log Bayes factor of greater than 28, compared to the next best model
(which had the same network structure, but added lateral connections)
and a posterior probability of N0.9999. This ﬁts precisely with what one
would predict, given the known anatomyof the visual system (Felleman
and Van Essen, 1991).
Estimated precision
In linewith our prediction that reaction time reﬂected the estimated
precision of sensory evidence, the results of our family level random ef-
fects inference (Penny et al., 2010) strongly favoured the ‘gain’ family of
models, in which RT modulated the intrinsic amplifying connection
from spiny stellate to pyramidal cells, rather than the ‘connection’
family in which it modulated the strength of ascending connections be-
tween regions, or the ‘null’ family in which it had no effect (exceedance
probability 0.986).
Group level analysis of single subject parameter estimates – generat-
ed by Bayesian model averaging across the winning family – showed a
signiﬁcant RT modulation in the PPC (μ= 1.090, p20 = 0.012) but not
in MT (μ = 0.992, p20 N 1.000) or VC (μ = 1.022, p20 = 0.153) (all
statistics Wilcoxon signed rank test, Bonferroni corrected for three
comparisons). None of the differences showed a signiﬁcant interaction
with region, when corrected for multiple comparisons. Thus, our ﬁnd-
ings conﬁrm that the effect size of RT-dependent gain on pyramidal
cells in the PPC is large in relation to intersubject variability but cannot
preclude similar effects in MT and VC.
Intrinsic variability
To assesswhether intrinsic variability (in other words variability not
induced by changes in motion coherence level) was also reﬂected in es-
timated precision, we performed family level random effects inference
on data binned for each coherence level. Consistent with ourmain ﬁnd-
ings, the family of models in which RT modulated pyramidal cell gain
was strongly favoured (exceedance probability 0.989), suggesting that
a substantial component of intrinsic variability ismediated by estimated
precision.
Neuronal dynamics in the PPC
Consistent with the idea that slow ramping activity similar to that
observed in monkey PPC during perceptual-decision making occurs in
humans, reconstructed pyramidal cell activity in the PPC closely
matched predictions of biophysical decision-making models (Wang,
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that recorded frommacaque parietal cortex (Cook andMaunsell, 2002).
Speciﬁcally, neuronal dynamics in the PPC source showed slowly
ramping activity that was faster for lower RT trials (Fig. 6). The form
of this ramping is exactly consistent with the predictions of mutual in-
hibition models (Bogacz et al., 2006; Wong and Wang, 2006; Hunt
et al., 2012). Activity in the other sources of the DCM did not resemble
that in the PPC (Fig. 6), suggesting that they do not express the same
form of decision-making dynamics that were recruited by this task.
Sensitivity analysis
The results of our sensitivity analysis showed that changes in the
gain of intrinsic connections within PPC, when compared with changes
in the strength of forward connections fromMT to PPC, produced clearly
differentiable responses. Gain modulations produced changes that in-
creased smoothly and approximately linearly across the time window
of interest. Modulations in the strength of forward connections by con-
trast produced changeswhich, after an initial dip, increasedmore rapid-
ly before reaching a plateau (Fig. 7).
Discussion
Understanding basic mechanisms in decision-making is crucial for
any account of human or animal behaviour. A rich literature on slow
ramping activity in the posterior parietal cortex and its putative role
in evidence accumulation (Gold and Shadlen, 2007) has developed sep-
arately from more general theories of perception and brain function
(Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2010). We sought to bridge this gap
by testing a key prediction of generalised predictive coding in the con-
text of decision-making requiring integration of information over a sig-
niﬁcant period of time. In predictive coding schemes, a key role is played
by the expected precision or uncertainty associated with bottom-up
sensory information (prediction errors), relative to the precision of
top-down predictions. The expected precision is thought to be encoded
by the gain on superﬁcial pyramidal cells that report prediction error
(Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Bastos et al., 2012). In the context of percep-
tual evidence accumulation, this suggests that higher estimates of preci-
sion should result in faster accumulation, and thus faster responding.
Evidence in support of this hypothesis thus represents an importantFig. 6. Normalised pyramidal cell activity averaged across subjects for each of the sources in the
modulated by response time, as predicted for a putative decisionnetwork, but thiswasnot obser
bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals).step towards setting the literature on evidence accumulation during
decision-making into a broader (normative) context.
We found that, in linewith normative (Bayesian) accounts, precision
(as reﬂected by the intrinsic connections to pyramidal cells) is strongly
correlated with both the speed of decision-making and the slope of
ramping activity. This extends the ﬁndings of previous studies that sug-
gest a key role for precision in modulating both the gain on sensory sig-
nals and psychophysical performance (Garrido et al., 2009; Rahnev
et al., 2011a, 2011b; Brown and Friston, 2012; Kok et al., 2012; Vossel
et al., 2013) in other types of perceptual tasks. It also suggests that deci-
sions which require integrating information over an extended period
can be understood within generalised predictive coding, something
we will address in future theoretical work. Our particular focus will be
on the accumulation of evidence – not just for one perceptual category
or other – but for the precision (reliability) of incoming sensory infor-
mation. In principle, this application of generalised predictive coding
has the potential to explain deviations of empirical responses from cur-
rent normative accounts, like drift-diffusion models.
Although our ﬁndings supportmechanistic predictionsmade bypre-
dictive coding, it is conceivable that other formulations couldmake sim-
ilar predictions. Indeed, given that predictive coding is (Bayes) optimal,
it would be worrying if an alternative normative formulation (such as
drift or racemodels) could not be formulated in terms of predictive cod-
ing. Thus, all one can conclude from our results is that they are consis-
tent with neuronally plausible (predictive coding) implementations of
(Bayes optimal) evidence accumulation. This is important because, un-
like other normative accounts, predictive coding also provides an expla-
nation for a vast array of other perceptual, cognitive and motor
phenomena, ranging from perceptual categorisation, through visual
search to sensory attenuation during action. Having said this, to assert
that the brain uses predictive coding to accumulate evidence will re-
quire multiple lines of converging evidence, which we and others are
actively pursuing. Of particular note in this context is a recent study
reporting that gain control during perceptual decision-making depends
upon stimulus variability, exactly as a predictive coding account would
predict (Cheadle et al., 2014).
Our analysis bridges a gap between our knowledge of decision cir-
cuits in non-human animals such as the macaque and humans (Gold
and Shadlen, 2007). To a large extent, this issue is methodological.
Decision-processes are, by nature, fast and dynamic and difﬁcult towinning DCM. Posterior parietal cortex (rightmost ﬁgure) showed slow ramping activity
ved in any other region. (Red:RT bin 1.Green: RT bin 2. Blue: RT bin 3.Dotted lines indicate
Fig. 7. A: Top panel. Sensitivity analysis. To provide a qualitative illustration of the different predictions of gain and connectivitymodel families, we simulated the effect of small changes in
model parameters on activity in the left PPC (all parameters other than those being perturbedwere set to their posterior expectations). Altering the gain on the intrinsic connectionwithin
the PPC produced changes that increase smoothly (solid line), whereas altering the strength of the forward connection fromMT to PPC produces an initial dip followed by a faster increase
in activity which rapidly reaches a plateau (dotted line) (similar patternswere observed in right PPC). B: Bottom panel.Modelﬁts. The ﬁts of the gain (left) and forward connection (right)
model families in sensor space for an illustrative subject. Responses are summarised by the ﬁrst two principal spatialmodes (used for data reduction—weused eightmodes in total). Solid
lines indicate predicted responses, dotted lines indicate observed data. The gain model family provided a signiﬁcantly better ﬁt to the data, as illustrated here by a closer correlation be-
tween predicted and observed responses (Red: RT bin 1. Green: RT bin 2. Blue: RT bin 3).
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227T.H.B. FitzGerald et al. / NeuroImage 107 (2015) 219–228studywithmethods such as fMRI. Oneway to bridge this divide is to use
predictions of large scale neuronal activity in the analysis of EEG orMEG
data (Hunt et al., 2012).We have used dynamic causal modelling in this
setting to provide a biologically realistic neuronal model of distributed
responses that allows us to understand neuronal responses in terms of
speciﬁc synaptic mechanisms.
Our study complements and extends previous studies of decision-
making in humans. Hunt et al. derived similar predictions to those
used here, and applied them to MEG data collected during an economic
decision-making task, suggesting candidate regions in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal lobule (Hunt et al., 2012). Recent
studies of perceptual decision-making have found evidence for evolving
decision signals in centro-parietal EEG electrodes (O'Connell et al.,
2012; Kelly and O'Connell, 2013) and MEG sensors (de Lange et al.,
2010). It has also been shown that gamma band activity in the visual
cortex reﬂects the encoding of sensory evidence (Siegel et al., 2007),
and that the integral of this reﬂected in lateralised beta band activity
reﬂecting action selection (Donner et al., 2009; Siegel et al., 2011).
This ﬁts with predictive coding models, where prediction errors have
been associated with fast gamma activity in supragranular layers
(Bastos et al., 2012). Elegant trial by trial analysis has also recently sug-
gested a role for low frequency oscillations inmodulating the rate of ev-
idence accumulation during perceptual decision-making (Wyart et al.,
2012). It has also been shown that beta-band activity in fronto-
parietal areas reﬂects decision accuracy (Donner et al., 2007), and corre-
lates of task difﬁculty have been found in evoked response potentials
(Philiastides and Sajda, 2006; Philiastides et al., 2006). A number of
fMRI studies have also suggested a role for the parietal cortex (Tosoni
et al., 2008; Liu and Pleskac, 2011) and other areas (Heekeren et al.,
2004, 2006; Ho et al., 2009; Philiastides et al., 2011) in evidence
accumulation.
One limitation of using dynamic causal modelling for evoked re-
sponses is that we are unable to detail responses that are not evoked
by an input. As such, we are unable to model neuronal activity immedi-
ately prior to response execution, which is an important aspect of evi-
dence accumulation (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). However, given recent
demonstrations of similar dynamics in human EEG (O'Connell et al.,
2012; Kelly andO'Connell, 2013), togetherwith the fact that the activity
we observed resembles slow ramping activity found in non-human pri-
mates (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Gold and Shadlen, 2007) – both in
anatomical location and time course – we assume that the activity we
observed reﬂects evidence accumulation.
In addition to PPC, our source localisation identiﬁed regions of the vi-
sual cortex and the middle temporal area. A large body of work has im-
plicated MT in motion processing and shown that is has a causal role in
decision-making (Britten et al., 1992, 1993; Ditterich et al., 2003). Our
study is the ﬁrst to directly examine effective connectivity between
MT and the PPC during perceptual decision-making. In our modelling,
the placement of MT below PPC in the winning model ﬁts well with
the notion that evolving decision signals in PPC are based on sensory ev-
idence received fromMT during the random-dot motion task (Ditterich
et al., 2003; Hanks et al., 2006). In a random-dot motion paradigm, the
quanta of sensory evidence themselves are not degraded (in the sense
that each individual dot as the same spatial precision at each coherence
level). Instead, manipulating coherence alters the precision of informa-
tion about overall motion direction, a high order attribute or cause of vi-
sual input. This suggests that variations in precision at the level of PPC
(presumably encoding hypotheses about motion direction), rather
than lower in the cortical hierarchy are likely to be key. Nonetheless, it
is conceivable that precision changes throughout the cortical hierarchy
also play a role. In light of the fact that we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differ-
ences between the strength of modulation across different regions in
our group level analyses, we make no speciﬁc claims about which re-
gions within the network are key for precision-mediated alterations in
slow ramping PPC activity and behavioural responding. We acknowl-
edge that this remains an open question for future research.We did not observe activity in other areas previously implicated in
perceptual decision-making such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Philiastides et al., 2011) and frontal eye ﬁelds
(Gold and Shadlen, 2000). Since we chose to consider only an early
phase of the decision-process, it is possible that frontal areas are
more closely linked to the executive aspects of decision-making
(Gold and Shadlen, 2000, 2007) and may not have been strongly active
within the time window we analysed. Our modelling does not imply
that only the cortical sources we consider here are important for per-
ceptual decision-making, but rather makes claims about precision and
neuronal dynamics, within the network of regions highlighted by
source localisation.
Given its putative position within the dorsal stream, and
hypothesised role in linking sensory information and motor planning
(Gold and Shadlen, 2000; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010), modulation of pre-
cision in the PPC (and possibly elsewhere) is an obvious candidate
mechanism for a top-down modulatory inﬂuence on perceptual deci-
sions (Shipp et al., 2013). Thismight include effects of prior probabilities
and reward contingencies, perhaps driven by the pulvinar, prefrontal
cortex or basal ganglia. Exploring the mechanisms by which such top-
down factors inﬂuence perceptual decision-making represents an im-
portant area for future study.
Because we were primarily interested in the effects of estimated
subjective coherence (precision) on each trial, we chose to divide up
our data by these subjects' response speed rather than objective stimu-
lus features such as coherence levels. Given that there is a strong corre-
lation between response speed and coherence levels in our paradigm
(Fig. 1), one can make similar predictions about the relationship be-
tween coherence and neuronal responses, though the relationship is
likely to be weaker, since response times depend directly upon the
dynamics of the network. It is likely that there are multiple sources of
response variability over and above differences in the strength of in-
coming sensory evidence, for example speed–accuracy tradeoffs or
local variations in the decision threshold. Indeed, this possibility is sug-
gested by our results when controlling for the effects of motion coher-
ence. To the extent that these additional factors impact on the
weighting of sensory evidence they are captured by our model. To the
extent that they are mediated by other mechanisms that are not
reﬂected in early evoked responses (for example strength of belief
needed to commit to a decision), they simply add noise to our results
rather than presenting a confound.
The extent to which ramping activity in the PPC reﬂects a link be-
tween perceptual processing and motor planning, as compared with
‘pure’ evidence accumulation, remains controversial (Gold and
Shadlen, 2007; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; O'Connell et al., 2012). As
such, it is possible that a component of the activity we observed (per-
haps particularly in the fastest response bin) reﬂects motor processes
as well as sensory ones. Given the signiﬁcant gap between the end of
the time window we modelled (500 ms) and the mean RT associated
with the fastest response bin (1068 ms) any motor planning processes
will be closely (or even inextricably (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Friston
et al., 2012)) bound up with the accumulation of sensory evidence,
but the imperatives of sensorimotor processing remain a caveat when
interpreting these results.
In conclusion, our results provide the ﬁrst direct evidence for slowly
evolving decision processes in the human PPC during perceptual
decision-making that are akin to those observed in the macaque, and
suggest that the dynamics of evidence accumulation in this region is
modulated by estimated precision encoded by the gain on pyramidal
cells, as predicted by generalised predictive coding (Friston and
Kiebel, 2009; Bastos et al., 2012). In addition, we recover the causal
structure of an a priori plausible network of regions involved in
decision-making about motion. Understanding the core processes in-
volved in decision-making is crucial for any wider account of normal
or pathological decisions (Montague et al., 2012), and slow ramping ac-
tivity in the PPC is likely to be as important in human choice as it is for
228 T.H.B. FitzGerald et al. / NeuroImage 107 (2015) 219–228macaques (Hanks et al., 2006; Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Our results thus
represent a step towards understanding the dynamics of decisions in
the human brain within the broader context of predictive coding, and
bridging the gap that currently exists between our understanding of
decision-making in humans, and other primates.
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